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28 U.S.C. § 1782 authorizes federal judges to grant assistance to a “foreign or international tribunal” for discovery proceedings. The meaning of the term “foreign or international tribunal” has been the subject of much dispute.
In 2019 the Sixth Circuit became the first court of appeals
to extend the purview of the statute to private commercial
arbitration, creating a circuit split. However, the use of 28
U.S.C. § 1782 in arbitral proceedings raises a number of
questions about whether U.S. style discovery would impede
the efficiency of arbitration and whether the practice could
be extended to international tribunals located within the
United States. This Note explores the contours of the statute
and the implications of the Sixth Circuit’s decision.
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INTRODUCTION
“Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every
fact, every opinion.”1 Writing for a unanimous Sixth Circuit, Judge
John K. Bush opened his opinion for Abdul Lateef Jamil Transportation Co. v. FedEx Corp. (“FedEx”) with this excerpt from a letter
written by Thomas Jefferson to his nephew.2 Jefferson’s words
personify reason and offer imagery of her tribunal as a truthseeking decisionmaker.3 This literary epigraph quoted in the FedEx
opinion foreshadowed the court’s expansive application of 28
U.S.C. § 1782 (“§ 1782”).4 It stood as an erudite gateway to an
opinion that dramatically departed from the decisions of two other
Courts of Appeals,5 creating a circuit split based on the meaning of
two words: arbitral tribunal.6

1

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 14, 15 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955), quoted in In
re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings (Abdul Latif
Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 713 (6th Cir. 2019).
2
FedEx, 939 F.3d at 713.
3
See id.
4
See id. at 713–14.
5
See id. at 726.
6
See id. at 724; In re Grupo Unidos Por El Canal S.A., No. 14-mc-80277JST (DMR), 2015 WL 1815251, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2015). In Grupo
Unidos, the court poignantly expressed the issue that continues to divide courts:
“Two words from a law review article quoted by the Supreme Court . . . have
spawned disharmony in the courts regarding whether [§ 1782] applies to private
arbitrations established by contract.” Id. The “two words” referred to by the
court were “arbitral tribunals.” Id. (discussing Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004)).
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The statute at issue in FedEx was § 1782,7 which authorizes
federal judges to grant assistance in discovery to foreign and international tribunals.8 In relevant part, the statute reads,
The district court of the district in which a person
resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal . . . . The order may be
made . . . by a foreign or international tribunal or
upon the application of any interested person and
may direct that the testimony or statement be given,
or the document or other thing be produced, before
a person appointed by the court.9
This statute, which represents a powerful discovery tool in foreign
and international litigation, has been the subject of much dispute.10
One of the most contentious issues is the interpretation of the
phrase “a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal,” leading
to speculation about whether such judicial assistance is available in
private commercial arbitration.11
The Sixth Circuit’s recent decision in FedEx signified the first
time that a Court of Appeals held that private arbitral tribunals are
“foreign or international tribunals” within the meaning § 1782 and,
therefore, may qualify for judicial assistance.12 The FedEx decision
split from prior opinions issued by the Fifth and Second Circuits

7

FedEx, 939 F.3d at 713.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
9
Id. (emphasis added).
10
See LUCAS V.M. BENTO, THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISCOVERY 46–47
(2020) (“These couple hundred words [that constitute § 1782] have been the
source of over 1,000 reported federal district court decisions, over 150 federal
appellate decisions, and one major U.S. Supreme Court decision.”).
11
See id. at 108–10.
12
See Gilbert A. Samberg & Todd Rosenbaum, Calling SCOTUS: Sixth
Circuit Re-Establishes Circuit Split Re U.S. Discovery in Aid of Foreign Commercial Arbitration (28 U.S.C. § 1782), NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/calling-scotus-sixth-circuit-reestablishes-circuit-split-re-us-discovery-aid.
8
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which reached the opposite conclusion.13 Since the split, the topic
has been hotly debated, requiring other courts to weigh in on the
issue.14 But crucial questions remain: Was FedEx correctly decided? How far should the scope of § 1782 extend? What impact will
the decision have on private arbitral proceedings? This Note endeavors to comprehensively address each of these questions.
This Note has three principal parts. The first Part of this Note
will describe the origin of § 1782 and Congress’ expansion of the
statute’s scope in light of globalization. It will also discuss how
appellate courts have interpreted the phrase “foreign or international tribunal” narrowly and why the Supreme Court conversely
suggested that the language was meant to encompass a broad range
of dispute resolution procedures. The second Part offers a detailed
account of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in FedEx and explains
how the court reached its conclusion that private arbitral tribunals
fall within the ambit of § 1782. Lastly, the third Part explores the
conclusions reached by other circuit courts since the circuit split
and discusses whether the FedEx decision would be confirmed by
the Supreme Court. It also examines questions that remain unanswered about the impact of § 1782 on private arbitration.
I.

THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF § 1782

A.
The Evolution of 1782
International judicial assistance has existed in the United States
since the founding of the country.15 The first recognized means for
foreign litigants to obtain evidence in the United States was
through letters rogatory and commissions: In general, a foreign
court could make a request to a U.S. court for assistance in the dis13
Id.; In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings
(Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 726
(6th Cir. 2019).
14
See John B. Pinney, Update: The Section 1782 Conflict Intensifies as the
International Arbitration Issue Goes to the Supreme Court, 38 ALTS. HIGH COST
LITIG. 125, 125 (2020).
15
See Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreign and
International Proceedings, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 597, 600 (1990); Michael Campion Miller et al., 28 U.S.C. § 1782 and the Evolution of International Judicial
Assistance in United States Courts, FED. LAW., May 2012, at 44, 44.
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covery process and, if accepted, the U.S. court would appoint a
commissioner to gather the evidence sought.16 The purpose of the
process was to “aid[ ] in the administration of justice.”17 The discovery tool, however, was rarely used due to challenges in executing letters rogatory at that time and because federal courts were
resistant to providing assistance to foreign courts.18
In the aftermath of the second world war, the United States
made a concerted effort to facilitate and strengthen relationships
among nations.19 Growing incentives for cross-border cooperation
inspired Congress to revitalize prior legislation regarding judicial
assistance by passing 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in 1948.20 Just a year later,
the statute was amended for broader application in 1949.21 The
revived and modernized statute authorized the district court where
a “witness resides or may be found” to compel “[t]he deposition of
any witness within the United States to be used in any judicial proceeding pending in any court in a foreign country with which the
United States is at peace.”22
16
Stahr, supra note 15, at 600 nn.12–13; see also EDWARD P. WEEKS, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DEPOSITIONS § 128 at 151 (1880) (“There is a broad
distinction between the execution of a commission and the procurement of testimony by the instrumentality of letters rogatory or requisitory. In the former
case, the rules of procedure are established by the court issuing the commission,
and are entirely under its control. In the latter, the methods of procedure must,
from the nature of the case, be altogether under the control of the foreign tribunal which is appealed to for assistance in the administration of justice.”).
17
Stahr, supra note 15, at 600–01.
18
See Miller et al., supra note 15, at 44. For a more complete history of
international judicial assistance between 1780 and 1948, see Stahr, supra note
15, at 600–04.
19
Miller et al., supra note 15, at 44–45; see, e.g., History of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/model-united-nations/historyunited-nations (last visited May 15, 2021) (explaining that after World War II
there existed a strong sentiment that international cooperation would lead to
lasting peace between countries and that this was motivation behind establishing
the United Nations).
20
See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247–48
(2004); Stahr, supra note 15, at 602–03; Miller et al., supra note 15, at 44–45;
Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1782, 62 Stat. 869, 949.
21
See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 248; Miller et al., supra note 15, at 44; Act of
May 24, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-72, § 93, 63 Stat. 89, 103.
22
See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1782, 62 Stat. 869, 949;
Act of May 24, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-72, § 93, 63 Stat. 89, 103.
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Over the next decade, however, international trade expanded
rapidly, and Congress determined that the statute required considerable revision to meet the needs of increased commercial disputes.23 In 1964, § 1782 was expanded in four major respects: (1)
assistance was available for the retrieval of documents and other
evidence, not just for the taking of depositions; (2) the word
“court” was replaced with “foreign or international tribunal”; (3)
discovery could be sought by “any interested person”; and (4) there
was no longer a requirement that litigation be pending, but the evidence sought must eventually be used in a proceeding.24 The goal
was to aid in foreign and international proceedings and to encourage other countries to reciprocate such assistance.25
These additions to the traditional notion of judicial assistance
left much to interpretation by the courts, particularly the phrase
“foreign or international tribunal”—a term that was left undefined
by the drafters of the statute.26 Since the rise of private international arbitration over the last thirty years, one of the most hotly debated issues with regards to § 1782 discovery has been whether private commercial arbitration falls within the definition of “foreign
or international tribunal.”27
23

See Nicolò Trocker, U.S.-Style Discovery for Non-U.S. Proceedings:
Judicial Assistance or Judicial Interference?, 1 INT’L J. PROC. L. 299, 307
(2011). See generally Harry Leroy Jones, International Judicial Assistance:
Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J., 515, 516–18
(1953) (discussing the ways in which judicial assistance fell short in 1953 and
addressing the need for legislative improvements).
24
Trocker, supra note 23, at 307–08; Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88619, § 9, 78 Stat. 995, 997 (§ 1782 as enacted by Congress).
25
Trocker, supra note 23, at 308. These goals are often referred to as the
“twin-aims” of the statute. Id.; see also Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 252 (citing Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664, 669 (9th Cir. 2002).
26
See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir.
1999) (explaining that “foreign or international tribunal” was left undefined in
§ 1782); Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 263 n.15 (“In light of the variety of foreign
proceedings resistant to ready classification in domestic terms, Congress left
unbounded by categorical rules the determination whether a matter is proceeding
‘in a foreign or international tribunal.’”); Trocker, supra note 23, at 309.
27
See BENTO, supra note 10, at 106–08 (explaining that the issue of defining “foreign or international tribunal” has been most contentious in the context
of private arbitrations). See generally id. at 106–28 (illustrating a comprehensive
history of how courts have construed “foreign or international tribunal” in context of private arbitration).
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B.

Circuit Courts Exclude Arbitral Tribunals from § 1782
Discovery
In 1999, the Second Circuit became the first court of appeals to
address the issue of whether a private arbitration qualifies for
§ 1782 aid in National Broadcasting Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co.
(“National Broadcasting”).28 The case concerned a commercial
arbitration proceeding between National Broadcasting Company
(“NBC”) and Azteca, a Mexican broadcasting company, administered by the International Chamber of Commerce in Mexico.29 In
anticipation of arbitration, NBC submitted a § 1782 discovery request in the Southern District of New York to serve third-party
financial institutions with document subpoenas.30 The request was
initially granted but later quashed because the district court found
that “the term ‘foreign or international tribunal’ in
[§ 1782] . . . does not encompass private international commercial
arbitration.”31
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed this ruling.32 In its
analysis, the court explained that the word “tribunal” was ambiguous and, therefore, private arbitral panels could not necessarily be
included or excluded.33 It then examined the legislative history of
the statute to discern the meaning of “tribunal” and determined that
“the word ‘tribunal’ is used to make it clear that assistance is not
confined to proceedings before conventional courts . . . .”34 Nevertheless, the court concluded that “tribunal” was reserved for “governmental entities . . . acting as state instrumentalities or with the
authority of the state.”35

28

See Nat’l Broad. Co., 165 F.3d at 185; see also Anna Conley, A New
World of Discovery: The Ramifications of Two Recent Federal Courts’ Decisions Granting Judicial Assistance to Arbitral Tribunals Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1782, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 45, 50 (2006) (explaining that Second Circuit
was first court of appeals to consider this matter).
29
Nat’l Broad. Co., 165 F.3d at 186.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 191.
33
Id. at 188.
34
Id. at 188–89 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 88–1052, at 9 (1963); S. REP. NO.
88–1580, at 7 (1964)).
35
Id. at 189.
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In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on House and Senate Reports, which mention “state instrumentalities,” such as foreign administrative tribunals, quasi-judicial agencies, and investigative magistrates.36 These supplementary materials, however,
failed to mention private dispute resolution proceedings and, therefore, the court found that “[t]he absence of any reference to private
dispute resolution proceedings such as arbitration strongly suggests
that Congress did not consider them in drafting the statute.”37
Moreover, the court noted that prior legislation used the term
“international tribunal” to refer to intergovernmental tribunals pursuant to a treaty.38 The court reasoned that although the 1964 revisions were meant to broaden the scope of the statute, the inclusion
of private arbitration would have been an extreme deviation from
the original intent of the statute and would have warranted
acknowledgement.39 The court found that “[t]he legislative history’s silence with respect to private tribunals” proves that extending
§ 1782 to private arbitration was not the intent of Congress.40
The Second Circuit also reasoned that this type of discovery
would conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), the
body of law in the United States that controls judicial treatment of
arbitration agreements.41 It explained that § 1782 would provide
for broader discovery in private arbitration than that permitted under § 7 of the FAA.42 For example, § 7 of the FAA permits only
arbitrators to seek judicial assistance and the evidence is limited to
testimony and material physical evidence.43 By contrast, § 1782
allows “any interested party” to apply for judicial assistance, and
the district court has the power to compel a person to give testimony, give a statement, or to produce “a document or other thing for
use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”44 The
court determined that allowing such broad evidence-gathering
mechanisms as provided for by § 1782 would overburden the al36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id.
Id.
Id. at 189–90.
Id.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 187–88.
Id.
Id.; 9 U.S.C. § 7.
28 U.S.C. § 1782.
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ternative dispute resolution process—a mechanism that is valued
for its time and cost efficiency.45
That same year, the Fifth Circuit in Republic of Kazakhstan v.
Biedermann International (“Biedermann”) also found that “§ 1782
does not apply to private international arbitrations.”46 The court
closely followed the reasoning of the Second Circuit but made a
note that international commercial arbitration would have been
considered a novel concept in 1964 and, therefore, would not have
been contemplated by the drafters.47
C.

The Supreme Court Unlocks the Door to a Broader
Interpretation of § 1782
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (“Intel”) marked
the first time in history that a § 1782 decision was reviewed by the
Supreme Court.48 In that case, Advanced Micro Devices filed an
antitrust complaint against Intel Corporation with the DirectorateGeneral for Competition of the European Commission (“European
Commission”) and petitioned the Northern District of California
for the production of documents under § 1782.49 One of the issues
before the Court was whether a proceeding before the European
Commission constituted a “foreign or international tribunal” under
§ 1782.50 While the question of whether § 1782 is available to private arbitrations was not before the Supreme Court, Justice Gins-

45
See Nat’l Broad. Co., 165 F.3d at 190–91 (“The popularity of arbitration
rests in considerable part on its asserted efficiency and cost-effectiveness . . . .”).
46
Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 881 (5th Cir.
1999).
47
Id. at 882; Conley, supra note 28, at 52.
48
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 246 (2004);
Daniel A. Losk, Section 1782(a) After Intel: Reconciling Policy Considerations
and a Proposed Framework to Extend Judicial Assistance to International Arbitral Tribunals, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1035, 1046 (2005) (“Ruling on § 1782(a)
for the first time in the statute’s 150 years of existence, the Supreme Court in
Intel delivered a broad, liberal interpretation of the availability of judicial assistance.”).
49
Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 246.
50
See id. at 246–47; see also European Commission, EUR. UNION,
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/europeancommission_en (last visited May 15, 2021) (explaining that the European
Commission is the executive branch of the European Union).
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berg, writing for the majority, constructed an expansive interpretation of “tribunal.”51
In its analysis the Court noted that the 1964 version of the statute deliberately replaced “any judicial proceeding” with “a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”52 The Court reasoned that the change permitted aid to administrative and quasijudicial proceedings—in other words, the 1964 version expressly
provided for non-judicial proceedings.53 Additionally, the Court
chose to read the language of the statute liberally, stating that
“Congress left unbounded by categorical rules the determination
whether a matter is proceeding ‘in a foreign or international tribunal.’”54
Most significantly, the Court cited with approval an article
written by Hans Smit, one of the chief architects of the 1964 revisions, which states, “[t]he term ‘tribunal’. . . includes investigating
magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals . . . .”55 Another
portion of Professor Smit’s article briefly noted by the Court explains, “[t]he increasing number and importance of international
tribunals make this liberal provision of assistance in aid of litigation in international tribunals of great significance. . . . The new
legislation [] authorizes assistance in aid of international arbitral
tribunals.”56
Intel was significant for judicial assistance. The Court concluded that the European Commission was a “tribunal” within the ambit of § 1782 on the basis that it operated as a “first-instance decisionmaker” that was subject to judicial review.57 It also established
a four-factor test intended to guide judges when deciding whether
51

Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 257–58, 263 n.15.
Id. at 258.
53
See id.
54
Id. at 263 n.15.
55
Id. at 258 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citing Hans Smit,
International Litigation under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015,
1026 n.71, 1027 n.73 (1965)); Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones
S.A. v. JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc., 685 F.3d 987, 994 n.4 (11th Cir. 2012)
(explaining that Professor Smit was “dominant drafter” of 1964 revisions to
§ 1782).
56
Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 258; Smit, supra note 55, at 1027 n.73 (emphasis
added).
57
Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 258.
52
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to grant § 1782 discovery aid to a party.58 But most notably, the
opinion disrupted the trend toward excluding commercial arbitration from § 1782, causing many to speculate whether National
Broadcasting and Biedermann were correctly decided.59
It was two words—“arbitral tribunals”—quoted by the Supreme Court from Professor Smit’s article that “spawned disharmony in the courts regarding whether [§ 1782] applies to private
arbitrations established by contract.”60 After Intel, a flurry of district court opinions were published addressing the definition of
“foreign or international tribunal” under § 1782, and across district
courts no consensus was reached on the matter.61
The first court of appeals to address the issue following Intel
was the Eleventh Circuit.62 Relying on Intel, the court concluded
that a commercial arbitration was a “tribunal” for the purposes of
§ 1782 discovery because the arbitral panel was a “first-instance
decisionmaker” that was subject to judicial review.63 The court,
however, mysteriously revised its opinion two years later and sua
sponte withdrew its judgement on whether an arbitral tribunal constitutes a § 1782 tribunal.64 This application of Intel remained un-

58

See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264–65.
See, e.g., Losk, supra note 48, at 1048–50.
60
In re Grupo Unidos Por El Canal S.A., No. 14-mc-80277-JST (DMR),
2015 WL 1815251, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2015).
61
See, e.g., In re Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1226 (N.D. Ga.
2006) (“The Court holds that the [arbitral panel] is a ‘foreign or international
tribunal’ within the meaning of § 1782(a).”); In re Oxus Gold PLC, MISC No.
06-822007-GEB, WL 1037387, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2007); In re Grupo Unidos
Por El Canal, S.A., No. 14-mc-00226-MSK-KMT, 2015 WL 1810135, at *8 (D.
Colo. Apr. 17, 2015); Helen Trading S.A. v. McQuilling Partners Inc., No. 4:18MC-154, 2018 WL 7252925, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2018); see also In re
Storag Etzel GmbH, No. 19-mc-209-CFC, 2020 WL 1849714, at *1 n.1 (D. Del.
Apr. 13, 2020) (listing all cases to date that have addressed the issue of whether
“tribunal” in § 1782 includes arbitral bodies).
62
Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. JAS Forwarding
(USA), Inc., 685 F.3d 987, 989–90 (11th Cir. 2012), superseded by 747 F.3d
1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2014).
63
See id. at 994–97.
64
See Consorcio, 747 F.3d at 1265, 1270 n.4.
59
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explored by appellate courts until 2019 when the issue came before
the Sixth Circuit.65
II.

ABDUL LATIF JAMEEL TRANSPORTATION CO. V. FEDEX CORP.
Fifteen years after Intel, the Sixth Circuit concluded that private arbitration is a “foreign or international tribunal” within the
purview of § 1782 in FedEx.66 The principal issue before the court
was whether a commercial arbitration taking place in a foreign
country between a Saudi corporation and a U.S. corporation could
gain access to § 1782 assistance.67 Judge Bush, writing a unanimous decision, found inspiration in the words of Thomas Jefferson: “Thomas Jefferson once counseled his nephew Peter Carr on
how to think: ‘Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal
every fact, every opinion.’ This case calls upon us to do just
that.”68
A.
Background: Facts and Procedural History
In 2014, FedEx International, a division of FedEx Corporation
(“FedEx Corp.”), entered into a General Service Provider (“GSP”)
contract with Abdul Latif Jameel Transportation (“ALJ”), a Saudi
company.69 The GSP provided that ALJ would provide delivery
services for FedEx International within Saudi Arabia.70 The contract contained an arbitration clause that required all disputes arising from the GSP to be settled through arbitration in Dubai under
the rules of the Dubai International Financial Centre-London Court
of International Arbitration (the “DIFC-LCIA”).71
The relationship between the parties began to sour with both
parties claiming breach of contract, and by 2018, all attempts at
65

See In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings
(Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 714
(6th Cir. 2019).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 713.
68
Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787),
in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 14, 15 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955).
69
Id. at 714; Corrected Brief for Respondent-Appellee FedEx Corp. at 4,
FedEx, 939 F.3d 710 (2019) (No. 19-5315) [hereinafter FedEx Brief].
70
FedEx, 939 F.3d at 714.
71
Id.
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reconciliation had been completely frustrated.72 As a result, FedEx
International initiated the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration, in accordance
with the GSP.73 On May 14, 2018, ALJ applied to the Western
District of Tennessee for an ex parte order, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782, to obtain discovery from FedEx Corp. for use in the arbitration proceedings located in Dubai.74 The district court denied
ALJ’s application, concluding that the phrase “foreign or international tribunal” in § 1782 did not include private arbitral proceedings, such as DIFC-LCIA; therefore, ALJ was not eligible for assistance under § 1782 for those proceedings.75 On April 12, 2019,
ALJ appealed to the Sixth Circuit.76
B.

Relying on the Language of the Statute, the Sixth Circuit
Found that “Tribunal” Encompasses Private Arbitration
In determining “whether the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration panel
qualified as a § 1782(a) ‘foreign or international tribunal,’” 77 the
court relied heavily on an analysis of the language of the statute. In
searching for the definition of “tribunal,” the court examined the
plain meaning of the word, the historical legal uses of the word,
and finally, the statutory definition of “tribunal.”78 The answers
found in this textual exploration determined the outcome of the
case: According to the Sixth Circuit, the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration
panel qualified as a “foreign or international tribunal” within the
purview of § 1782.79
72

See id. at 714–15.
Id. at 715.
74
Id. at 715–16. In addition to the GSP, FedEx International and ALJ had
entered into a Domestic Service Agreement (“DSA”) that contained an arbitration clause requiring the parties to settle any dispute in Saudi Arabia under Saudi law. Id. at 714. Before FedEx International commenced the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration, ALJ had submitted to a dispute in connection with the DSA to a Saudi
arbitration panel. Id. at 715. ALJ sought § 1782 assistance for discovery in both
the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration and the Saudi arbitration; however, the Saudi arbitration was dismissed, so the Sixth Circuit declined to decide the issue with respect to that arbitration. Id. at 716–17.
75
Id. at 716.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 717.
78
See id. at 717–18.
79
Id. at 723.
73
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Because the drafters of the statute left the term “foreign or international tribunal” undefined, the court began its analysis with an
examination of the plain meaning of “tribunal.”80 It noted that
there was no evidence to indicate that either “international tribunal” or “foreign tribunal” was a term of art with a specialized
meaning.81 As a result, the court decided to focus exclusively on
the definition of “tribunal.”82
To start, the court considered it important to examine the use of
the word at the time the statute was drafted,83 and looked to both
legal and non-legal dictionary definitions of “tribunal” to discern
its meaning.84 It found that legal dictionaries from the time did not
consistently define the scope of the word “tribunal”: In some cases,
the definition was broad enough to include private arbitration, and
in other cases, it was not.85 The court could not rely on these inconsistent definitions.86
Instead, the court turned its attention to the use of the word
“tribunal” in legal writing.87 It observed that “American jurists and
lawyers have long used the word ‘tribunal’ in . . . a sense that includes private, contracted-for, commercial arbitral panels,”88 citing
several examples of this use of the word as far back as the 1850s.89
It noted that even private arbitrations at issue before the Supreme
Court have been referred to as “tribunals,” both before and after
the drafting of § 1782.90
80

Id. at 717.
Id. at 718–19.
82
Id. at 719 (“[T]here is no dispute that the DIFC-LCIA arbitration is ‘foreign or international’ in nature. Thus, we focus on the meaning of ‘tribunal,’
which is hotly disputed.” (footnotes omitted)).
83
Id. at 717.
84
Id. at 719–720.
85
Id.
86
See id. at 720.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
See id. at 720–21 (“Justice Joseph Story’s Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence used the word “tribunal” to describe private, contracted-for arbitrations . . . .” (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 1457 at 955 (6th ed. 1853))).
90
See id. at 721–22 (first citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,
Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956); then citing Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger,
348 U.S. 176, 185 (1955) (Black, J., dissenting); then citing Red Cross Line v.
81
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Finally, because an inquiry into the context in which the word
is used within legislation is an essential facet of statutory interpretation, the court looked to the congressional meaning of the word.91
It found that “evidence of congressional usage does not compel a
narrower understanding of [“tribunal”] than its linguistic meaning.”92 For example, § 1782 reads, “[t]he [§ 1782 discovery] order
may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in whole
or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or producing the document or other thing.”93 FedEx Corp. took the position that the term “foreign or international tribunal” applies exclusively to governmental entities because only governmental entities
will have established procedures for the taking of evidence.94 The
Sixth Circuit quickly dismissed this assertion, explaining that the
inclusion of the phrase “may be in whole or in part” is permissive—there is no requirement that such procedures be applied or
that it be shown that they even exist, but if the adjudicatory body
uses particular procedures in the collection of evidence, “then the
district court may order that evidence be collected pursuant to
those procedures.”95 The court explained that no other uses of the
word “tribunal” within the statute indicate a more limited definition of the word.96
The court relied heavily on the statutory language, explaining
that its “analysis begins with the language of the statute[,] [a]nd
where the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there
as well.”97 The court concluded: “[T]he text, context, and structure
of [§ 1782] provide no reason to doubt that the word ‘tribunal’ inAtlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 121 n.1 (1924); and then citing Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1985)).
91
FedEx, 939 F.3d at 722 (“[I]f the overall context and structure of the
statute indicate that Congress used the word in a different sense than its linguistic meaning, the congressional meaning controls.”).
92
Id.
93
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a); FedEx, 939 F.3d at 722.
94
Id. at 722–23.
95
Id. at 723 (emphasis added).
96
Id. (describing only one other appearance of the word “tribunal” and explaining that its use was “not inconsistent with a definition of the word that includes private arbitrations”).
97
Id. (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999)).
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cludes private commercial arbitral panels . . . . Therefore, we need
look no further to hold that the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration panel is a
‘foreign or international tribunal.’”98 With that, the Sixth Circuit
reversed the decision of the lower court.99
C.
The Sixth Circuit Addressed Remaining Arguments
Although the Sixth Circuit arrived at its decision at the end of
its analysis of statutory language, it nevertheless went on to identify and examine all remaining arguments that could implant doubt
in the court’s findings. It addressed its disagreement with the statutory interpretation in Biedermann and National Broadcasting.100 It
also bolstered its own conclusion with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Intel.101 Lastly, the court dispensed with all public policy
concerns that had been raised.102 The Sixth Circuit’s thorough investigation into all contrary arguments helped to reinforce its final
conclusion and justify its split from the other Courts of Appeals.
1. “FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL” IS NOT LIMITED
TO GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
The Second and Fifth Circuit court decisions relied heavily on
legislative history in finding that under § 1782 a “foreign or international tribunal” could not be a private arbitral proceeding.103 According to these courts, the legislative history indicated that the
statute was intended to apply exclusively to government entities.104
The FedEx court found these conclusions to be unpersuasive.105
First, the FedEx court found that legislative history is not controlling in statutory interpretations.106 It explained that the reliability of legislative history has been questioned because it consists of
98

Id.
Id. at 723, 732.
100
Id. at 726.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 728.
103
See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 188–90 (2d
Cir. 1999); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 881–82
(5th Cir. 1999).
104
See Nat’l Broad. Co., 165 F.3d at 188–90; Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 881–
82.
105
FedEx, 939 F.3d at 726–28.
106
See id. at 726.
99
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rough drafts and preliminary writings that may not reflect the ultimate intentions of the majority.107 Second, in this case, neither the
legislative history nor the text of § 1782 contain limiting language
and, therefore, if the court were to rely on such sources it would
still reach the same conclusion.108 The court emphasized that both
legislative history and the statutory language provide evidence of
Congress’ intent to expand the reach of § 1782, and “the legislative
history does not indicate that the expansion stopped short of private arbitration.”109
The Sixth Circuit also dispensed with the notion that, under Intel, a § 1782 “tribunal” must be limited to a judicial or statesponsored entity.110 It rejected the idea that the second Intel factor
(“a court . . . may consider the nature of the foreign tribunal, the
character of proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of
the foreign government, court, or agency to federal-court judicial
assistance”111) intended to limit or define tribunal.112 In support,
the court quoted Justice Ginsburg’s explanation that Congress “left
unbounded by categorical rules the determination whether a matter
is proceeding ‘in a foreign or international tribunal.’”113 All in all,
the Sixth Circuit made a strong assertion that § 1782 was intended
to be construed broadly and, therefore, private arbitration is under
the umbrella of “foreign or international tribunals.”
2. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DID NOT IMPACT THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT’S CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit turned to policy considerations last, explaining that policy arguments carry very little weight in its decision
107

See id. at 727.
See id. at 727–28.
109
Id. (“The facts on which the legislative history is most clear are that the
substitution of ‘tribunal’ for ‘judicial proceeding’ broadened the scope of the
statute, and . . . removed the requirement that the United States be a party to an
international agreement under which a proceeding takes place.”).
110
See id. at 723–26.
111
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 244 (2004).
112
FedEx, 939 F.3d at 725–26 (“Indeed, that the Court made ‘the nature of
the foreign tribunal’ a factor for the district court to consider suggests that the
Court was not attempting to contemplate any and all possible types of ‘tribunal’
in which § 1782(a) discovery might be granted.”).
113
Id. at 726 (quoting Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 263 n.15).
108
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because “achieving a better policy outcome . . . is a task for Congress, not the courts.”114 The court, however, went on to address
these concerns because even if it “were inclined to countenance
policy arguments,” such arguments do not mandate that the court
reach a different conclusion.115
One policy argument asserted by FedEx Corp. was that § 1782
unfairly grants broader discovery than what is typically available
in domestic arbitration disputes.116 Chapter 1 § 7 of the FAA,
which governs domestic arbitration in the United States, empowers
only arbitrators to request judicial assistance in the discovery process.117 By contrast, § 1782 provides that “any interested person,”
including parties and even third parties, may petition federal courts
for evidentiary aid.118 Thus, foreign parties engaged in arbitration
would have access to a discovery tool that is not available to parties in domestic arbitration.119
The Sixth Circuit was unpersuaded by this argument.120 It
pointed out that the Intel court dispensed with such concerns due to
the fact that under § 1782, there is no requirement that a foreign
party provide equivalent information or grant U.S. citizens similar
access to judicial assistance.121 Indeed, “Section 1782 . . . does not
direct United States courts to engage in comparative analysis to
114

Id. at 728 (citations omitted) (alterations included) (citing Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 13–14 (2000)).
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
9 U.S.C. § 7 (“The arbitrators . . . may summon in writing any person to
attend before them or any of them as a witness and in a proper case to bring with
him or them any book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed material as evidence in the case.”).
118
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (“The district court of the district in which a person
resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal . . . . The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued,
or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of
any interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or
the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the
court.”).
119
FedEx, 939 F.3d at 728.
120
Id. at 729.
121
Id.; Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 263
(2004).
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determine whether analogous proceedings exist [domestically].”122
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit explained that if there is a concern
for equality between parties in foreign or international arbitration
proceedings, the district court has discretion to deny a § 1782 application or condition acquiescence on a reciprocal exchange of
information.123
Another policy consideration raised by FedEx Corp. was the
concern that qualifying private arbitration for § 1782 assistance
could have the effect of encumbering the arbitration process, which
is valued for its cost and time efficiencies.124 The Sixth Circuit was
not persuaded by this point because Intel grants district judges the
discretion to deny a request if it is “unduly intrusive or burdensome.”125
Lastly, FedEx Corp. argued that extending § 1782 discovery to
private arbitration would be incongruous to the “twin aims” of
§ 1782, which are to “provid[e] efficient assistance to participants
in international litigation and encourag[e] foreign countries by example to provide similar assistance to our courts.”126 FedEx Corp.
argued that such a decision would “actually disserve[] United
States interests because it ‘encourage[s] foreign countries to undermine U.S. policy in favor of enforcing private arbitration
agreements by granting discovery inconsistent with those agreements.’”127 The Sixth Circuit countered this assertion by again reminding FedEx Corp. that the district court has discretion to refuse
any § 1782 request and may do so if it perceives the discovery request to be contrary to the agreement of the parties.128
Overall, the Sixth Circuit relied primarily on the meaning of
the word “tribunal” in concluding that the DIFC-LCIA arbitration
qualifies as a § 1782 “foreign or international tribunal”—neither
legislative nor policy arguments dissuaded the court from reaching
this conclusion. The court reversed the district court’s decision and
122
123
124
125
126
127

FedEx, 939 F.3d at 729 (quoting Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 263).
See id.
Id. at 729–30.
See id. at 730 (citing Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 265).
Id. (citing FedEx Brief, supra note 69, at 20).
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting FedEx Brief, supra note 69, at

20).
128

Id.
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remanded it for further consideration, instructing the lower court to
apply the Intel factors to determine whether the § 1782 request
should be granted.129
III.

THE SUPREME COURT MUST ADDRESS THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
CREATED BY FEDEX
The Sixth Circuit created a split among Courts of Appeals that
will not easily be neglected by the Supreme Court130—especially
given the significance of private arbitration in modern cross-border
transactions.131 Unsurprisingly, a number of courts have already
been confronted with the question of how to define “tribunal” in
the context of § 1782 discovery since the FedEx decision in
2019.132 But, these subsequent decisions have not brought greater
clarity to the issue: Inevitably, the Supreme Court will need to clarify the statutory meaning of “tribunal.” This Note posits that the
Supreme Court would likely support the FedEx court’s comprehensive analysis on the issue and would approve of its interpretation of § 1782.
A.

The Application of § 1782 to Arbitral Tribunals Continues
to be Disputed
With the ever-growing prevalence of international commerce,
arbitration has become the preferred dispute resolution process in
cross-border commercial transactions.133 As a result, several courts
129

Id. at 732.
See Pinney, supra note 14, at 125.
131
See Matthew J. Soroky, Compelling U.S. Discovery in International
Franchise Arbitrations: The (F)utility of Section 1782 Applications, 39
FRANCHISE L.J. 185, 185 (2019); Laura Emmy Malament, Note, Making or
Breaking Your Billion Dollar Case: U.S. Judicial Assistance to Private International Arbitration Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), 67 VAND. L. REV. 1213, 1214
(2014).
132
See Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209, 210 (4th Cir. 2020);
Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 2020); In re
Guo, 965 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2020); In re Storag Etzel GmbH, No. 19-mc209-CFC, 2020 WL 1849714, at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2020); In re EWE
Gasspeicher GmbH, No. 19-mc-109-RGA, 2020 WL 1272612, at *1 (D. Del.
Mar. 17, 2020); HRC-Hainan Holding Co. v. Yihan Hu, No. 19-mc-80277-TSH,
2020 WL 906719, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2020).
133
See Soroky, supra note 131, at 185; Malament, supra note 131, at 1214.
130
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have already been asked to weigh in on the recent circuit split.134
Among Courts of Appeals, the Fourth Circuit has chosen to align
with the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute,135 while the
Second and Seventh Circuits have reached opposite conclusions.136
After FedEx, the Fourth Circuit was the next Court of Appeals
to examine the issue.137 Like the Sixth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit
found that Congress intended to expand the reach of § 1782 “to
increase international cooperation by providing U.S. assistance in
resolving disputes before not only foreign courts but before all foreign and international tribunals.”138 Also congruent with the Sixth
Circuit’s analysis, the Fourth Circuit rejected the idea that allowing
§ 1782 discovery in arbitral proceedings would “inject extraordinary delay and costs into arbitrations, thereby defeating their purpose and undermining parties’ bargained-for method of dispute
resolution” because any undue burden “can and should be managed by the district court with the discretion conferred on it by
[§ 1782].”139
Interestingly, in addressing the argument that § 1782 was
meant to apply only to government-controlled tribunals and not
private commercial arbitrations, the Fourth Circuit pointed to the
FAA as evidence that arbitration is in fact regulated by the government and would therefore be a product of “governmentconferred authority.”140 It explained that the FAA “provides particular procedural mechanisms for conducting arbitrations, as well
as for court supervision and enforcement of arbitral awards[,]”
which confirms that “arbitration in the United States is a congressionally endorsed and regulated process that is judicially supervised.”141
By contrast, in In re Guo, the Second Circuit upheld it’s ruling
in National Broadcasting “that the phrase ‘foreign or international
tribunal’ does not encompass ‘arbitral bod[ies] established by pri134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

See supra note 132 (listing cases).
See Boeing, 954 F.3d at 210.
See In re Guo, 965 F.3d at 100; Rolls-Royce, 975 F.3d at 690.
See Boeing, 954 F.3d at 210.
See id. at 213.
Id. at 214–15.
Id. at 213–14.
Id.

2021]

THE POWER OF TWO WORDS TO SPLIT CIRCUITS

1263

vate parties.’”142 The Guo court essentially found that Intel did not
overrule National Broadcasting because Intel never directly addressed the question of “whether a private international arbitration
tribunal qualifies as a ‘tribunal’ under § 1782.”143 It regarded Professor Smit’s definition of “tribunal” quoted in the Intel opinion as
mere dicta and overall, found Intel to be both unpersuasive and
non-binding.144
Similarly, in Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, the Seventh Circuit chose to align with National Broadcasting and
Biedermann.145 In reaching this decision the court conducted a
statutory interpretation of “foreign or international tribunal,” finding that it could only apply to “governmental, administrative, or
quasi-governmental” entities and not private arbitrations.146 It also
relied heavily on the fact that if § 1782 were available in private
international arbitrations, it would make available broader discovery than that which is available to domestic arbitrations, which it
found to be “a serious conflict with the [FAA].”147 Like the Guo
court, the Rolls-Royce court found the Supreme Court’s mention of
Professor Smit’s law review article to be insignificant.148
As the Courts of Appeals dispute the application of this discovery tool, parties to international arbitration agreements eagerly anticipate clarity.149 A resolution of this matter could affect the way

142
In re Guo, 965 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2020) (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184,
191 (2d Cir. 1999)).
143
Id. at 103.
144
Id. at 105.
145
Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir.
2020).
146
Id. at 694–95 (“Service-of-process assistance and letters rogatory—
governed by §§ 1696 and 1781—are matters of comity between governments,
which suggests that the phrase ‘foreign or international tribunal’ as used in this
statutory scheme means state-sponsored tribunals and does not include private
arbitration panels.”).
147
Id. at 695–96.
148
Id. at 696 (asserting that this portion of Intel opinion “has taken on outsized significance”).
149
Two other § 1782 cases recently appealed to the Third and Ninth Circuits.
In re EWE Gasspeicher GmbH, No. 19-mc-109-RGA, 2020 WL 1272612 (D.
Del. Mar. 17), appeal filed, No. 20-1830 (3d Cir. Apr. 16, 2020); HRC-Hainan
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arbitration agreements are drafted and will certainly influence how
parties approach pending disputes. The Supreme Court will need to
make a determination regarding the circuit split created by FedEx
in the near future.150
B.

The Supreme Court Would Likely Approve of the Analysis
in FedEx
In the event that FedEx or a similar case is granted certiorari, it
is reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court would uphold the
Sixth Circuit’s decision because the opinion presents a sound and
comprehensive statutory construction.
1. THE FEDEX EMPLOYED A STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
CONGRUENT WITH THE METHODS OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court commonly begins statutory interpretation
with the words of the statute at issue,151 and the FedEx court did
just that: It conducted a thorough textual analysis of “foreign or
international tribunal.”152 Because the definition of the term “foreign or international tribunal” was absent from the statute, the
FedEx court examined the plain meaning of the language of the
text,153 a practice that is consistently followed by the Supreme
Court.154 To determine the ordinary meaning of the word, the Sixth
Circuit employed the common Supreme Court practice of consultHolding Co. v. Yihan Hu, No. 19-mc-80277-TSH, 2020 WL 906719 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 25), appeal filed, No. 20-15371 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2020).
150
See Samberg & Rosenbaum, supra note 12.
151
See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012) (“One naturally must begin with
the words of the statute when the very subject of the litigation is what the statute
requires.”).
152
See In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings
(Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 717–
23 (6th Cir. 2019).
153
See id. at 717.
154
See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) (“When a
word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.”); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990)
(“‘In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language,’ giving the
‘words used’ their ‘ordinary meaning.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); and then quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962))).
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ing dictionaries.155 They found that contemporary dictionaries supported an interpretation of “tribunal” that is “broad enough to include private arbitration.”156 The Sixth Circuit further analyzed the
congressional meaning and legal use—including the Supreme
Court’s own use—of “tribunal” to support a broad interpretation of
the word.157
In fact, the Sixth Circuit specifically addressed the Supreme
Court’s use of the word “tribunal” in Intel to support its statutory
interpretation.158 It pointed out the Court’s own conclusion that
“the word ‘tribunal’ applies to non-judicial proceedings[,]” and
noted the Court’s tacit approval of Professor Smit’s definition of
“tribunal,” which explicitly included “arbitral tribunals.”159
By contrast, the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit courts conducted only a cursory analysis of the plain meaning of “tribunal,”
finding the term to be broad enough to encompass private arbitration, but concluding that it was simply ambiguous.160 The Sixth
Circuit rightly noted that “the Second and Fifth Circuits turned to
legislative history too early in the interpretation process.”161 By
neglecting to examine the congressional meaning and legal uses of
the word, these courts simply glossed over an essential step in statutory construction.162 Given the exhaustive textual examination
conducted by the Sixth Circuit, which included the ordinary definition, congressional meaning, and judicial uses of the word “tribu-

155
See, e.g., Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356,
2362–63 (2019) (using dictionaries from time that Congress enacted Freedom of
Information Act to determine the meaning of the word “confidential”).
156
FedEx, 939 F.3d at 719–20.
157
See id. at 718, 720–23 (“Words ‘must be read in their context and with a
view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” (quoting Davis v. Mich.
Dep’t of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)).
158
Id. at 723.
159
Id. at 724.
160
See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir.
1999); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 881 (5th Cir.
1999); Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 693–94 (7th Cir.
2020).
161
FedEx, 939 F.3d at 726.
162
The Seventh Circuit conducted a brief analysis of both the dictionary
definitions and congressional meaning of the term but failed to consider the
common legal uses. See Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 693–95.
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nal,” the Supreme Court would likely agree with the conclusion
reached by the Sixth Circuit.
2. THE FEDEX COURT ALIGNED ITS ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY WITH INTEL
Although the FedEx court relied almost exclusively on a strict
textual analysis of § 1782 to reach its conclusion, it did go on to
support its finding by addressing the legislative history of the statute.163 The Sixth Circuit made similar findings about the legislative
history of § 1782 as those presented by the Supreme Court in Intel.
It also used the analyses conducted by the Second and Fifth Circuits to support its own contrary conclusion.164
In Intel, the Supreme Court described the evolution of § 1782
where “any judicial proceeding” was replaced with “a proceeding
in a foreign or international tribunal.”165 This was significant because it extended the availability of the § 1782 discovery tool to a
variety of proceedings.166 The Court placed great emphasis on the
congressional intent to apply the statute broadly and emphasized
the lack of limits placed on the scope of the statute by Congress.167
The Supreme Court then underscored its legislative analysis with
Professor Smit’s quote defining “tribunal.”168 As a leading drafter
of the 1964 revisions to the statute, Professor Smit was cited repeatedly throughout Intel as persuasive authority on the meaning
and application of § 1782.169 Thus, the Supreme Court would like163

Fedex, 939 F.3d at 727–28.
Id.
165
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 257–58
(2004).
166
See id. at 249.
167
See, e.g., id. at 263 n.15 (“Congress left unbounded by categorical rules
the determination whether a matter is proceeding ‘in a foreign or international
tribunal.’”).
168
Id. at 258.
169
See id. at 247 n.1, 248, 249 n.8, 256–59, 261 n.12, 262 n.13, 265 n.17.
Indeed, Professor Smit has written much about the intended definition of tribunal, and his construction of the word clearly includes arbitral tribunals: For example, in another article, he wrote “the term ‘tribunal’ in Section 1782 includes
an arbitral tribunal created by private agreement.” Hans Smit, American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title
28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1, 6 (1998) [hereinafter American Assistance].
164
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ly continue to follow Professor Smit’s broad definition of the term
“tribunal” within § 1782.
Like the Supreme Court in Intel, the FedEx court found the legislative history to command liberal interpretation of the statute.170
In fact, the Sixth Circuit used the exact legislative sources cited in
National Broadcasting to reach an opposite conclusion.171 In National Broadcasting, the Second Circuit conceded that legislative
history indicates an intent to expand the statute but leaped to an
assumption that because private arbitration was not specifically
mentioned, it was not within the consideration of Congress at the
time the statute was drafted.172 This reasoning advanced by the
Second Circuit lacked concrete support.
The Sixth Circuit correctly pointed out that there is no evidence
that Congress intended to exclude private arbitration from the statute’s expansion.173 By contrast, “[t]he facts on which the legislative history is most clear are the substitution of ‘tribunal’ for ‘judicial proceeding’ broadened the scope of the statute,” indicating
“Congress’s intent to expand § 1782(a)’s applicability.”174 Like the
Supreme Court in Intel, the FedEx court found that the legislative
history points to a purposeful expansion of the statute without any
indication of limitations.
The reasoning in Intel indicates that the Supreme Court would
approach statutory construction of § 1782 using textual analysis
and legislative history, much like the Sixth Circuit did in FedEx.
Given the Intel court’s use of the word tribunal, its explanation of
the broadening of the statute in the 1960s, and its approval of Professor Smit’s definition of the word “tribunal,” the Supreme Court
would likely agree with the conclusion reached in FedEx.

170
See In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings
(Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 728
(6th Cir. 2019).
171
Id. at 727–28.
172
Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“The absence of any reference to private dispute resolution proceedings such as
arbitration strongly suggests that Congress did not consider them in drafting the
statute.”).
173
FedEx, 939 F.3d at 728.
174
Id.
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IV.
THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE ARBITRATION IN LIGHT OF FEDEX
Although the FedEx opinion provided a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the issues surrounding the application of
§ 1782 to private arbitration, the decision left many questions unanswered. Primary among them is whether the statute will impermissibly burden the arbitration process and create asymmetry
among parties.175 Although the FedEx court addressed this argument in its opinion, the effect of its decision remains to be seen in
real-world application. Additionally, if international arbitral tribunals qualify for aid under § 1782, it is possible that the discovery
tool would be utilized by arbitral tribunals considered to be “international” but are, in fact, located domestically.176
A.
Remaining Public Policy Considerations
The most common concern about extending § 1782 to private
arbitral proceedings is that it will impermissibly burden the arbitration process.177 Private arbitration has overwhelmingly become the
leading choice of dispute resolution in international commercial
contracts and plays an essential role in the increasingly globalized
economy.178 Parties to cross-border transactions value arbitration
as a process that is cost-effective and efficient.179 There is a widespread fear that these benefits will vanish if § 1782 is made available in private arbitration because it will encumber the alternative

175

See, e.g., Malament, supra note 131, at 1231–32 (discussing concerns
expressed by Second Circuit in National Broadcasting).
176
See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L COM. DISPS., N.Y.C. BAR, 28 U.S.C. § 1782 AS
A MEANS OF OBTAINING DISCOVERY IN AID OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION—APPLICABILITY AND BEST PRACTICES 32–35 (2008) [hereinafter
NEW YORK CITY BAR COMMITTEE], https://www.nycbar.org/member-andcareer-services/committees/reports-listing/reports////57461369f8f0a1240059dd
9f/01-01-2008/12-31-2008/1/10 (discussing whether § 1782 should apply to
“foreign or international tribunals” seated in the United States).
177
See Malament, supra note 131, at 1231–32; Kenneth Beale et al., Solving
the § 1782 Puzzle: Bringing Certainty to the Debate Over 28 U.S.C. § 1782’s
Application to International Arbitration, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 51, 91–92 (2011);
Conley, supra note 28, at 67–68.
178
See Malament, supra note 131, at 1214; Soroky, supra note 131, at 185.
179
Malament, supra note 131, at 1231.
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dispute resolution mechanism with broad U.S.-style discovery and
greater judicial involvement.180
The concern that § 1782 discovery would be cumbersome and
inequitable was expressed by both the Second and Fifth Circuits.181
The Sixth Circuit, however, found these concerns to be overblown
because “§ 1782(a) is permissive: the district court ‘may’ order
discovery, and the Supreme Court has made clear that the district
court has wide discretion in determining whether and how to do
so.”182 Not only did Intel create a list of four factors for judges to
consider before granting a § 1782 request, but it also empowered
judges to reject any request deemed unreasonable or inconsistent
with the goals of the parties.183 In other words, a request must
withstand the scrutiny of a court—it is by no means automatically
granted.184
Additionally, in addressing inequitable access to discovery, the
Supreme Court rejected the idea that an applicant must provide
equivalent discovery.185 It noted that if fairness was a concern, “a
district court could condition relief upon that person’s reciprocal
exchange of information.”186 The arbitrators also have the power to
exclude any evidence they deem to be improper and “can place
conditions on its acceptance of the information to maintain whatever measure of parity it concludes is appropriate.”187
Arbitration is a mechanism that is contracted for by the parties.188 Some have expressed concern that allowing § 1782 discovery in private arbitrations would be contrary to the provisions
180

Beale et al., supra note 177, at 91–92.
Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 190–91 (2d Cir.
1999); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir.
1999).
182
In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings
(Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 730
(6th Cir. 2019) (citing Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S.
241, 261–62, 265–66 (2004)).
183
Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264–66.
184
See id. at 266 (“Having held that § 1782(a) authorizes, but does not require, discovery assistance, we leave it to the courts below to ensure an airing
adequate to determine what, if any, assistance is appropriate.”).
185
Id. at 262–63.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
See Conley, supra note 28, at 67–69.
181
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agreed upon by the parties, which often prescribe very limited discovery.189 The second Intel factor, however, asks district courts to
consider “the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the
proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign
government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court
judicial assistance.”190 Accordingly, the rules and proceedings of a
party-selected arbitral tribunal, the receptivity of that tribunal to
discovery assistance, and the intentions of the contracting parties
would weigh in a court’s decision to grant the § 1782 request.191
There is ample opportunity for parties, judges, and arbitrators to
ensure the discovery process is reasonable, fair, and harmonious
with the goals of the arbitration.
Further, the Biedermann and National Broadcasting courts
voiced concern that § 1782 discovery conflicts with the FAA because it grants broader discovery than is permitted in domestic arbitration.192 The FedEx court dispels this concern by pointing out
that nothing requires domestic arbitration and international arbitration to provide equivalent discovery.193 Professor Smit has commented that
[t]he fact that [§] 1782 . . . does not deal with the
domestic arena cannot be seriously considered as an
argument for limiting its intended purpose in the international arena. On the contrary, if anything, it
should move the legislature dealing with domestic
adjudication to emulate the reform achieved on the
international level. . . . In fact, the aim of the drafters of [§] 1782 was that domestic legislatures adopt

189

Id. at 68–69.
Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264.
191
See In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings
(Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 730
(6th Cir. 2019); Malament, supra note 131, at 1241 (proposing a four-step
framework for district courts when deciding whether to grant a § 1782 request).
192
Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 187–88 (2d Cir.
1999); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 882–83 (5th
Cir. 1999).
193
FedEx, 939 F.3d at 728–29 (citing Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 260–61).
190
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the liberalized rules they provided for the international situation.194
Thus, in light of Intel and FedEx, the public policy arguments
present unpersuasive points. These cases prove that § 1782 is only
available in limited circumstances, alleviating the concern that
such judicial assistance in private arbitration would over-burden
arbitration proceedings, unfairly benefit foreign parties, or infringe
upon the intentions of the contracting parties.
B.

The Applicability of § 1782 to International Arbitral
Proceedings Seated Domestically
Should the Supreme Court agree to extend § 1782 assistance to
private arbitration proceedings, another issue is whether an arbitral
tribunal that is seated in the United States and considered to be
“international” falls within the § 1782 definition of “foreign or international tribunals.” International arbitral tribunals located within
the United States could reasonably be included within the § 1782
definition of “foreign or international tribunal.”
1. “FOREIGN TRIBUNAL” AND “INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL”
HAVE DIFFERENT MEANINGS
The text of § 1782 implies a distinction between what is considered to be a “foreign tribunal” versus an “international tribunal.”195 Indeed, the statute reads, “[t]he district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give
his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing
for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”196
This indicates that these terms are distinct.
The FedEx court found no evidence that the terms “foreign tribunal” and “international tribunal” are terms of art.197 “Foreign”
and “international” have, however, been used and defined in dis-

194

Hans Smit, The Supreme Court Rules on the Proper Interpretation of
Section 1782: Its Potential Significance for International Arbitration, 14 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 295, 311 (2003).
195
See 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
196
Id. (emphasis added).
197
See FedEx, 939 F.3d at 718–19.
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tinctly different ways within the context of arbitration.198 For example, “foreign arbitration” has been used in a much narrower capacity to describe arbitration proceedings taking place in another
country.199 Accordingly, it seems that the definition of “foreign
arbitration” primarily focuses on the geographical location of the
tribunal.200 By contrast, “international arbitration” has a broad
meaning that does not depend on the location of the proceedings.201
2. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ENCOMPASSES NONDOMESTIC ARBITRATION AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION
Chapter 2 of the FAA enforces the New York Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“the
Convention”), which was created to “encourage the recognition
and enforcement of international arbitral awards.”202 Accordingly,
the term “international arbitral awards” includes both “awards
made in a [state] other than that in which enforcement of the award
is sought” as well as those awards “not considered as domestic” in
the state of enforcement.203 Those awards have been referred to as
198

See, e.g., Hans Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 629, 629–
30 (1989) [hereinafter A-National Arbitration].
199
See, e.g., Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir.
1983). Article I of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards states: “This Convention shall apply to
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a
State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards
are sought . . . .” United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S.
38 [hereinafter The New York Convention]. The Second Circuit refers to this as
the “territorial criterion,” explaining that a foreign arbitral award—one rendered
in another country—meets the “territorial criterion.” Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 931–
32.
200
See Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 931–32; Stahr, supra note 15, at 619.
201
See Stahr, supra note 15, at 619; A-National Arbitration, supra note 198,
at 629–30.
202
Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte Gmbh, 141 F.3d
1434, 1440 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932); 9 U.S.C.
§ 201.
203
See Indus. Risk, 141 F.3d at 1440; Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 931; see also
Paolo Contini, International Commercial Arbitration: The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 8 AM.
J. COMP. L. 283, 293–94 (1959) (“Article I [of the Convention] seems to permit
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“foreign awards” and “non-domestic awards,” respectively.204
Thus, it follows that because Chapter 2 governs “international arbitral awards,” then “foreign awards” and “non-domestic awards”
both fall within the purview of “international arbitral awards.”
Unfortunately, the Convention does not define a “nondomestic” award.205 Courts, however, have relied on § 202 of the
FAA in interpreting the term.206 The section provides as follows:
An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the
United States shall be deemed not to fall under the
Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.207
In other words, an award is “non-domestic” if the arbitration
involves property located abroad or the dispute is not “entirely between citizens of the United States.”208 Courts have found that an
only one construction . . . . [T]he Convention applies to all arbitral awards rendered in a country other than the state of enforcement, whether or not any of
such awards may be regarded as domestic in that state; it also applies to all
awards not considered as domestic in the state of enforcement, whether or not
any of such awards may have been rendered in the territory of that state.”).
204
See, e.g., Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932. The court explains that awards “not
considered as domestic” or “nondomestic awards” are “made within the legal
framework of another country . . . or involving parties domiciled or having their
principal place of business outside the enforcing jurisdiction. Id. It also points
out that for an award to be considered a “foreign award” it must meet the “territorial criterion” of being made outside the jurisdiction where enforcement is
sought. Id.
205
Id.
206
See, e.g., Indus. Risk, 141 F.3d at 1440–41.
207
9 U.S.C. § 202.
208
See Indus. Risk, 141 F.3d at 1441 (“We read [Section 202 of the Convention] to define all arbitral awards not ‘entirely between citizens of the United
States’ as ‘non-domestic’ for purposes of Article I of the Convention. We join
the First, Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in holding that arbitration agreements and awards ‘not considered as domestic’ in the United States are those
agreements and awards ‘which are subject to the Convention . . . because [they
were’ . . . involving parties domiciled or having their principal place of business
outside the enforcing jurisdiction.’” (alterations in original) (emphasis removed)
(quoting Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932)).
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arbitral agreement or award between parties, whereby one of the
parties is domiciled or has a principle place of business outside of
the United States, is considered to be “non-domestic”—even if the
seat of arbitration is located in the United States.209 Thus, according to U.S. precedent, an award is “non-domestic” if the dispute
involves an international element.
Based on the above interpretation of the Convention, international arbitration proceedings are both “foreign arbitrations”
(which relates to the location of the tribunal) and “non-domestic
arbitrations” (which relates to the nationalities of the parties, the
place where the contract is intended to be executed, and the location of any property at issue). Thus, because an international arbitration proceeding can take place within U.S. borders, an arbitration seated in the United States may be considered an “international tribunal” if the parties have different nationalities or the nature
of the contract is international.
Moreover, at the time § 1782 was constructed, the word “international arbitration” was used in reference to private commercial
arbitration between parties of different nationalities.210 For example, in 1923, forty years before the current form of § 1782 was introduced, the International Chamber of Commerce (the “ICC”), the
leading private commercial arbitral institute, established the Court
of International Arbitration for commercial disputes between parties from different countries.211 This indicates that the ICC defined
“international arbitration” based on the nationality of the parties
rather than the seat of arbitration and that the term “international
arbitration” encompassed private disputes at the time the statute
was drafted.
3. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION COVERS A WIDE SPECTRUM
OF ARBITRAL DISPUTES
“International arbitration” is a term that has been used to describe a wide range of arbitral disputes; it cannot be narrowly construed to apply, for example, exclusively to governmental entities.
Indeed, Professor Smit defined international arbitration broadly:
209

Id.
See JULIAN D. M. LEW ET
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 19 (2003).
211
Id.
210

AL.,

COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL
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“International arbitration deals with matters that have elements
connecting them to more than one state . . . .”212
U.S. courts have used the term “international arbitral proceedings” to describe a variety of private disputes. For example, it has
been used to describe treaty-based arbitrations, such as ICSID proceedings pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty or the U.S.Iranian Claims Tribunal.213 The term has also been used to refer to
foreign private commercial arbitrations seated in another country,214 and it has been used to characterize “non-domestic” arbitrations located within the United States between citizens of different
countries.215
Indeed, Professor Smit has noted that an arbitration proceeding
within the United States with parties of different nationalities may
be a “prime example of a truely [sic] international arbitration.”216
In explaining how § 1782 was intended to be construed, Professor
Smit confirms that “the broad term ‘international tribunal’ was
intended to cover all international arbitral tribunals.”217 He explained that “the term ‘international’ should be given the broadest
possible construction. Accordingly, a tribunal is international in the
sense of [§ 1782] when any of the parties before it, or any of the
arbitrators, is not a citizen or resident of the United States.”218
Thus, if the term “international tribunal” was meant to be defined
broadly and to include all international tribunals, then arbitrations
pursuant to a treaty, “foreign arbitrations,” and “non-domestic arbitrations” that are seated within the United States, are all within the
definition “international tribunal” under § 1782.

212

A-National Arbitration, supra note 198, at 629–30.
See, e.g., Itek Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 566 F. Supp. 1210, 1214
(1st Cir. 1983); In re Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
214
See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 636 (1985); Bahrain Telecomms. Co. v. Discoverytel, Inc., 476 F.
Supp. 2d 176, 177–78 (D. Conn. 2007).
215
See, e.g., Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte Gmbh, 141
F.3d 1434, 1440–41 (11th Cir. 1998).
216
A-National Arbitration, supra note 198, at 630.
217
American Assistance, supra note 169, at 5 (emphasis added).
218
Id. at 6–8.
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4. AN “INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL” NEED NOT BE SEATED
ABROAD UNDER § 1782
Another point of contention is whether § 1782 is intended solely for proceedings abroad, thereby barring application of the statute
to international tribunals located within the United States. This
argument may be supported by Intel, which does not directly address the issue but does place some emphasis on the tribunals located abroad. For example, Intel states, “a court presented with a
§ 1782(a) request may take into account the nature of the foreign
tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and
the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency
abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance.”219 Additionally,
the Intel court states, “Section 1782 is a provision for assistance to
tribunals abroad.”220 There is, however, no statutory language limiting the term “foreign or international tribunal” to proceedings
abroad and, as the FedEx court noted, there is nothing to indicate
that these quoted sections intended to define “tribunal.”221
Additionally, the Committee on International Commercial Disputes (“the Committee”) addressed this issue in a report that describes best practices for the use of § 1782 in international arbitration.222 The report explained that there is persuasive reasoning on
both sides: There are good arguments that § 1782 applies exclusively to tribunals located in another country, but there are also
convincing interpretations allowing for an “international tribunal”
to be seated in the United States.223 To settle the conflict, the
Committee proposes a “bright line rule” excluding any arbitral
proceedings seated within the United States from § 1782 discovery.224
This rule places arbitrary restrictions on § 1782, which was
meant to be construed broadly.225 Consider an example of a com219
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004)
(emphasis added).
220
Id. at 263.
221
See In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings
(Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 725
(6th Cir. 2019).
222
NEW YORK CITY BAR COMMITTEE, supra note 176, at 33–35.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 35.
225
See American Assistance, supra note 169, at 5.
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mercial arbitration located in Switzerland under German law between Australian and American parties according to ICDR Arbitration rules. In this example, the chosen arbitrators are citizens of
Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. Under the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, this arbitration qualifies as a “foreign or international
tribunal” for § 1782 purposes. The arbitrators and “any interested
party” are free to apply to a district court of the United States for
assistance under § 1782. Now, if everything remains the same, but
the seat of arbitration is moved from Switzerland to Miami, under
the bright line rule proposed by the Committee, the parties in this
arbitration would be stripped of the privilege of judicial assistance.
The only difference in these proceedings is the seat of arbitration.
Nevertheless, both tribunals are international in nature and may
encounter the same difficulties in obtaining discovery.
There is little difference between the decision to supply aid to
private international arbitral proceedings seated abroad versus
those located domestically. The fact that the seat of arbitration is
located within U.S. borders may have minimal bearing on the outcome of the arbitration.226 The parties are empowered to contract
for any location, nationality of arbitrator, arbitration rules, and
even applicable law.227 Thus, it may ultimately matter very little
where the arbitration actually occurs.228 In the end, it may lead to
forum shopping where parties choose the seat of arbitration outside
of the United States simply so that they can have access to a more
advantageous discovery tool.

226

See generally GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM
SELECTION AGREEMENTS 115–23 (1999) [hereinafter ARBITRATION AND FORUM
SELECTION] (explaining that one attraction of international arbitration is that
parties are free to choose what laws apply to their contract, where their disputes
will be resolved, and their arbitrators); JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF
ARBITRATION 29 (2013) (“The law applicable to arbitration is not the law applicable in arbitration. . . . [A] plurality of legal orders may serve as foundations of
the same arbitral process.”).
227
See ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION, supra note 226, at 115–23.
228
See generally PAULSSON, supra note 226, at 29–39 (explaining that modern arbitration is “subject to a multiplicity of systems” and the award may be
enforced in in a variety of jurisdictions whether or not an award’s country of
origin has accepted the award).
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5. § 1782 COULD BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS LOCATED IN THE UNITED STATES
An examination of the history of § 1782 demonstrates that it is
continuously being interpreted more liberally. According to judicial interpretations of the Convention, a tribunal seated within the
United States constitutes an international arbitral tribunal if the
nature of the dispute is international.229 Thus, it is possible that
§ 1782 could be extended to include international arbitral proceedings within the United States.
CONCLUSION
The FedEx court accomplished what Thomas Jefferson advised
his nephew to do—in its comprehensive opinion, it called upon
every fact and every opinion to structure its reasoning. Given its
broad application of § 1782 in Intel, the Supreme Court would be
likely to uphold the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that the term “foreign or international tribunal” within § 1782 encompasses private
arbitration. However, even if this facet of the § 1782 debate is finally settled, more questions regarding the scope of § 1782 in private arbitration wait below the surface, not least of which is
whether it can be extended to international arbitral proceedings
conducted within the United States.
This once forgotten and esoteric statute now rises to the forefront of the most important international commercial disputes, and
it will be imperative for the Supreme Court to address these emerging concerns that have an immense impact on global commercial
relations. Indeed, the Supreme Court will be required to bring
clarity to those two words that incited the recent circuit split—
“arbitral tribunals.”

229

See, e.g., Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte Gmbh, 141
F.3d 1434, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998) (concluding that an arbitration located in Florida between a German Corporation and a Florida Corporation is “non-domestic”
under the Convention); Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d
Cir. 1983) (concluding that an arbitration located in the United States between
two foreign parties is “non-domestic” under the Convention).

